Thisprovision,intendedtorestrictpartialrepossessionoflandbythelandowner,wasapparentlydraftedfromtheb,thepromisedlimi,when,inApril1949,thegovernmenturgedtherenegotiationofcontractstolowerrentalperce,thelandownercouldincreasetenantinputswithoutreducinglandsizetoattainthesameresult.

Toconclude,itisevidentthatthetheoryofsharetenancyimpliesincreasedfar,thehypothe,strongandevident,thatpensatingpaymentsandrighttransfersdidnottakeplacetoanysignificantextenttorestoretheinitialresourceuseunderfarmtenancy,andthatwearecertainthatadjustmentsoffarmingintensitywerenotrestricted.

[1].Withoutpensatingpaymentsorotherdevicessuchaslicensingtherighttoleaseland,theequilibriumofthisfixedrentcontrolwouldbeunclear;andthepossibleouteswouldbeseveralandsovariedthatwecouldbecertainofnone.

[2].SeeSidneyKlein,ThePatternofLandTenureReforminEastAsiaafterWorldWarII(NewYork:BookmanAssociates,1958),www.youxs.org.

[3].SeeChengChen,AnApproachtoChinasLandReform(Taipei:ChengChungBookCompany,1951),www.youxs.org.

[4].SeeSino-AmericanJointCommissiononRuralReconstruction,”JCRRAnnualReportsonLandReformintheRepublicofChina,”mimeographed(Taipei:FarmersServiceDivision,1965),www.youxs.org,(Taipei:1950and1952).

[5].Seechapter5ofthisstudy.

[6].www.youxs.org(Taipei:JCRR,1954),www.youxs.org,”maincrop”shouldread”maincrops.”InChinese,whentheexactnumberisnotspecified,pluralisimplied,,thelawmakermeanttosayone”main”cropperacreoflandperperiodoftime.

[7].SeeJCRR,”AnnualReports,”www.youxs.org.

[8].Chen,AnApproachtoChinasLandReform,www.youxs.org”reporting”theactualyieldwasfrequentlyomittedifsharedisputesdidnotarise.

[9].Seechapter5ofthisstudy.

[10].Perhapsthetranslationfromthecrops”chieflywanted”to”main”issomewhatmisleading.

[11].ChengChen,RecordsofTaiwanLandReform(Taipei:ChungHwaBookCompany,1961),www.youxs.org.

[12].SeeChen,AnApproachtoChinasLandReform,www.youxs.org.

[13].SeeChengChen,LandReforminTaiwan(Taipei:ChinaPublishingCo.,1961),www.youxs.org.

[14].www.youxs.org.

www.youxs.org

InthissectionIseektodiscussmorefundamentallythetheoreticalresultsoftherentalsharerestrictionintermsofpropertyrights.

Letmeintroduceanoperationalconceptforthepresentdiscussion:anindividualsrighttousearesourceexclusivelyandhisrighttoderiveunattenuatedine(orrentalannuity),givenanexclusiverighttousearesource(thatis,thepropertyrightheldbyanindividualisindependentofotherpeoplesaction),therighttoderiveinetherefromisalsoexclusive.”Ine”ishereusedasaprehen,andpetitionfortheownershiprightwillrevealthatmaximumvalue.

Anattenuationoftherighttoobtaininefromaprivatepropertyresourcebyale,availableeconomictheoryyieldsanequilibrium(andhenceasetofpredictablebehaviorwithrespecttoresourceuse),ineattenuationonapercentagebasisusuallyyieldsaspecifiablesetofconstraintswhichpermitsatheoreticalsolution,becausethedimensionsrestrictedallowchangesinchoicesamongoptionspredictablebythetheoryofchoice.

Attenuatingtherighttoderiveinefromresourceuseonapercentagebasis,withthediminishingportionofineunappropriatedandunassignedtosomespecificindividual(s),willproducethesameeffectsasattenuatingtheexclusiverighttousetheresource.[1],alandownerisentitledtoreceiveaportion,r,,

,andwithoutinputadjustment,thelandownersinefromhisresourceownershipisreducedby(r—

)/:towhomisassignedtherighttocollectthisportionofrent,thatis,(r—

)/rpercentoftherentunderafreemarket?InasmuchaswecaninterprettheexistingprovisionsandenforcementoflawinTaiwan,underthesharerestrictionthe,andallpotentialtenantswereallowedtopeteforit.

,underthesharerestriction,the(r—